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This paper examines the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) both 
theoretically and empirically.
There are two broad reasons why we might be interested in the NRU:
(i) The first relates to the concern we have for the steady state rate of 
unemployment that might pertain in some notional steady state. We are usually 
concerned if this number is above some socially acceptable level, and in 
particular if some proportion of these unemployed are involuntarily out of work.
(ii) The second relates to the level of unemployment at which inflation is 
supposed to stabilise. This concept is more often known as the NAIRU (non­
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), although NIIRU (non-increasing 
etc.) would be a more accurate acronym. The gap below actual unemployment 
and the NAIRU acts as an impulse for inflationary pressure.
One might expect that a paper written by someone working at a central bank 
might be exclusively concerned with the second concern. However, the focus of 
this paper is on the first aspect. Of course, in practice, these two roles are closely 
related not least because the long run does have the awkward habit of affecting 
short run behaviour.
It may be useful to start with some definitions and terminological conventions 
since much confusion is often needlessly generated over this issue. Consider the 
level of unemployment in the steady state.
It is common (if not de rigueur) in writing papers about the natural rate to quote 
Friedman’s definition:
‘The (NRU) is the level which would be ground out by the Walrasian system of 
general equilibrium equations, provided that there is embedded in them the actual 
structural characteristics of labor and commodity markets, including labour market 
imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering 
information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the cost of mobility, and so 
on" (Friedman. 1968, p. 8)
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CEPR conference on Unemployment 
Dynamics in Cambridge on December 16, 1996.1 am grateful to Alan Manning, Nigel Pain and 
members of Structural Economic Analysis Division at the Bank of England, in particular 
Jumana Saleheen, Philip Evans and Nigel Jenkinson for helpful discussions on the issues 
discussed in this paper. The views contained herein are those of the author and do not 



























































































This definition has often given rise to a semantic debate about whether a 
particular definition of long run unemployment (the NAIRU for example) was 
consistent with Friedman’s definition, or whether a particular theoretical model 
was Walrasian. This has not always been especially enlightening. A more 
straightforward definition to be adopted in this paper is simply to define the NRU 
as the steady state level of unemployment.
If all the equations in the general equilibrium model do grind to a (dynamic) 
steady state, it might seem that the NRU depends on everything. In fact, for most 
theoretical descriptions that are used to rationalise unemployment, it does not. 
Instead, the NRU is found to be unaffected by the instruments of demand 
management and ultimately only determined by supply-side variables, or by 
parameters which are functions of institutional structures. This “invariance 
property” explains the central importance of the concept of the NRU in 
discussions about macropolicy.2
The main function of this paper is to examine the theoretical basis for this 
“invariance property”. In order to clarify this issue, it is necessary to be rigorous 
about the theoretical underpinnings of the relationships between unemployment 
and wage-price inflation.
Two different approaches have been taken to estimating NAIRUs, structural and 
statistical.
• Structural methods involve the specification of relationships governing wage 
and price determination (or sometimes labour demand) usually based on some 
underlying theory of agents’ behaviour. The NAIRU is then derived from these 
relationships by computing the dynamic steady state level of unemployment 
which will necessarily be consistent with stable wage and price inflation. This 
approach is described most fully in Layard et al, (1990).
• Statistical or direct methods postulate the existence of an equilibrium 
unemployment rate or NAIRU but make no attempt to specify the underlying 
behave of economic agents. Instead, the NAIRU is derived from its supposed 
effects based on observations of the relationship between unemployment and 
inflation. Elmeskov (1993), and OECD (1996) provide examples of this type of 
approach.
This paper is solely concerned with the structural approach. This is not to say that 
the more direct approach is without merit. Indeed, it has many advantages, which 
may explain the increasing popularity of this type of research, in particular in the





























































































US. If the focus of attention is purely on forecasting inflation, then it allows us to 
derive predictions of inflation from the Phillips curve; by building in hysteresis 
effects into the Phillips curve (by including difference terms in unemployment), 
straightforward cross-country comparisons can me made of the degree of inflation 
persistence (see OECD, (1996); simple experiments can be conducted to test 
whether unemployment persistence is asymmetric or whether the effect of 
unemployment on inflation is non-linear at low levels of inflation (see Turner, 
1995); relatively simple measures of uncertainty surrounding the NAIRU 
estimates can be calculated (see Staiger et al. 1995, for example).
By contrast, this paper focuses on the structural approach to the NRU, taking a 
critical look at the imperfectly competitive bargaining approach popularised by 
Layard and Nickell. More accurately, this paper scrutinises the “textbook 
approach” to the battle of the mark-ups which characterises most empirical work 
adopting this framework (see Carlin and Soskice, 1990, for example). In doing 
so, two main questions are addressed.
First, is the NRU affected by movements in the labour demand curve? Many 
empirical estimates of the NRU are conditioned on factors which are clearly 
related to labour demand. Arguably, tax wedges and the real exchange rate fall 
into this category. This paper argues, following Manning (1993), that such effects 
often only arise because of theoretical inconsistencies between the price setting 
and wage setting equation. When the process of wage determination is specified 
more rigorously, it is shown that the NRU will be determined mainly by supply- 
side factors, although there will be a role for demand side factors to the extent 
that the labour share is endogenous. This issue is closely related to the question of 
whether the structural wage equation can be identified. In explaining how this 
problem arises and whether it matters, it is argued that the Manning result that the 
wage equation will not be identified can usually be overcome, in particular when 
the technology is not pure Cobb-Douglas.
The second issue to be examined is the role of labour supply behaviour in 
discussion of the NRU. In the discussion of the bargaining framework, supply- 
side variables such as the replacement ratio are central to the determination of 
unemployment, yet in empirical work, these variables are often found to be 
insignificant or very small. The paper explains how the “size” of the replacement 
ratio effect depends on how exactly the wage equation has been specified. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the concept of the reservation wage is actually 
overstated in the bargaining approach. This raises the question of whether the 
bargaining model is actually valid for the whole labour market. If those workers 
who are made unemployed by the rent-seeking activities of insider trade union 




























































































something more akin to the perfectly competitive model may be relevant. Indeed, 
it is precisely those workers at the bottom end of the labour market who are likely 
to become unemployed. But if the effective labour supply curve is actually 
upward-sloping or L-shaped, then the NRU will only be meaningful if the labour 
market is operating on the vertical portion of the labour supply curve. Illustrative 
empirical results are given from a stylised dual labour market model which shows 
that the concept of the NRU is meaningless in this type of model.
1. The textbook approach to the NRU
It is useful to begin by setting down a stylised version of the textbook approach to 
the NRU. This is often explained in terms of a “battle of the mark-ups”, whereby 
unemployment must move to equilibrate the demands of employers (the feasible 
real wage) and the demands of employees (the bargained real wage). This can be 
illustrated in terms of a downward-sloping price-setting or. labour demand 
schedule and an upward-sloping wage setting relationship which are drawn in real 
wage-unemployment space, intersecting to indicate the NRU.
Chart 1: The battle of the mark-ups.
Real wage
Algebraically, the simple price equation is usually written as
p - w = a 0 + a \  (1)
where p and w are the logs of the levels of prices and wages respectively and X| 
is a vector of variables such as productivity, the capital stock and the degree of 




























































































The wage-setting equation is written as
w— p — Z?q — b^u + b2X 2 + b2Z (2)
where X2 is another vector of demand side variables, possibly identical to X1( u is 
unemployment and Z is a vector of labour supply or wage-push factors such as 
union power or the replacement ratio.
For the sake of expositional clarity, no mention is made here of expectations, of 
wage and price dynamics giving rise to nominal inertia, or of hysteresis effects in 
wage setting giving rise to real inertia. All these effects are clearly crucial in 
determining the short run dynamics of the wage price system and its relationship 
between the NAIRU and the NRU. For this paper, the focus of attention is on the 
long run.
Accordingly, the NRU is determined by equating the expressions for real wages 
in equations (1) and (2) to derive an expression for the NRU ,
i.e. NRU =— [a0 +b0 +alX i +b2X2 +biZ] (3)
b \
It is immediately apparent from (3) that the invariance of the NRU to demand 
factors will only hold under special conditions; first, the demand factors in the 
price and wage equations should be the same; secondly, they should appear with 
an equal and opposite sign, i.e. aiX|=-b2X2- Under certain circumstances, these 
restrictions may appear to be justifiable, for example by including log 
productivity with a unit coefficient in both equations, effectively writing the 
system in terms of unit labour costs rather than real wages. Indeed, these 
restrictions are often vital in the case of trending variables such as productivity or 
technical progress since otherwise the NRU will tend to trend when projected 
into the future3. But in general, these demand effects will not always cancel out in 
the NRU expression. For example, effects from the tax wedge or real exchange 
rate often appear mainly due to the use of different price deflators in the wage and 
price equation. Joyce and Wren-Lewis (1990) for example illustrate the important 
implications that real exchange rate effects can have on the properties of a 
macroeconomic model, noting the importance of the distinction between internal
3 In some studies, for example Minford (I99x), more than one trending variable is included in 
the NRU expression so that the trends offset each other over the sample period (world trade 
and a time trend in that case). But this is clearly an unsatisfactory basis for making medium 




























































































and external balance. But it is precisely because these effects can have important 
implications that we need to be sure that their presence is justified theoretically.
So despite the widespread popularity of the battle of the mark-ups model and the 
corresponding chart, in fact, this expositional device more often serves to confuse 
the issue, since moves in the price setting schedule (or equivalently in the labour 
demand curve) will also give rise to movements in the wage-setting schedule. 
This problem is caused by the presence of demand side factors in the wage 
setting equation. Moreover, this feature of the theoretical framework also 
manifests itself as a problem for econometric researchers; if all the demand side 
variables are included in the wage equation, then this equation will not be 
identified. This problem is discussed in Manning (1993) and Bean (1994) and is 
easily illustrated in the context of equations (1) and (2) above. Clearly, if the 
vector of demand side variables in the price equation Xi is identical to those 
appearing in the wage setting schedule X2, then multiples of equation (1) can be 
added to equation (2), thus changing the coefficients in the wage setting schedule,
i.e. w -p  = Q(bo-b^u+bjX+b-}Z)+(\-Q)(-ao - djX) (4)
where 9 is an arbitrary parameter which can take any value between 0 and 1. So 
(4) can be re-written as
w -  p = [91>o -  (1 - 9  )ao]-Qb\u+Bb2 -  (1 -9 ) a j  X +9 b^Z  (4*)
Clearly (4*) has the same form as the original wage setting schedule (2), but the 
coefficients on X, Z and the constant will be different.
This insight does have important implications for the interpretation that can be put 
in the wage equation which emerges from the structural approach to estimating 
the NRU but on the whole empirical researchers in this area have tended to 
ignore the problem, usually relying on arbitrary identifying exclusion restrictions 
or ad hoc dynamics to identify the wage equation4. It is anyway important not to 
overexaggerate the importance of the identification problem. Even the true 
structural wage equation is not independent of demand factors, as already 
discussed, so in terms of the wage and price setting schedules of chart 1, we are 
simply estimating differently sloped versions of the wage curve all crossing the 
price curve at the same point (see chart 2).
J See Bean (1992) for a discussion of the circumstances under which these identifying 




























































































Chart 2: The implications of lack of identification for the wage setting 
schedule
Real wage
Putting this point slightly differently, the identification problem does not change 
the estimate of the NRU. Combining equation (4*) with the price equation leads 
to the same expression for the NRU as before. This point is frequently 
misunderstood; for example, Cross, 1993, and OECD, 1996 wrongly claim that 
the identification problem is responsible for the lack of precision in NAIRU 
estimates and the tendency for the NRU to change through time.
It has been suggested that one way that the identification problem can be 
overcome is by restricting the demand side coefficients in the wage equation to be 
consistent with that in the price equation (see Barrell et al., 1996, for example). 
This is an attractive strategy since it forces the researcher to include consistent 
demand side variables in the wage and price equations. Unfortunately, as 
Manning (1993) notes, this does not resolve the problem of identification. It is 
easy to why by examining equation (4*) which is the general form of the 
unidentified wage equation. If the relationship between real wages and X is 
constrained to be the same as in the price equation then this can only hold for 
9=0, that is by replicating the price equation again.
2. A more rigorous theoretical derivation
In fact, there is a way to resolve the identification problem in most cases. In order 
to see how, it is necessary to be slightly more rigorous in the derivation of the 





























































































where Y, N and K are output, labour and capital respectively, (3 is the labour 
share and o=l/(l+p) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. It 
is easy to show that the price equation can be written as
P i ~ wt = co-(>’- /) ,-p (a / - ( y - / ) ,)  (la)
This states that the mark up of prices over unit labour costs (wages less 
productivity) will depend on a constant, c0, related to the degree of product 
market competition, plus an endogenous term in the ratio of productivity to 
technical progress. This latter term will disappear in the Cobb-Douglas case 
(when p=0).
(la) can be re-expressed as a term in the labour share S, where
5, = c0 + p[p + (1 -  p)(Jt,- a , - l ,  )-P ]”(1/P) (lb)
where the endogenous term in the ratio of productivity to technical progress has 
been re-expressed a function of the capital labour ratio. But if firms are 
maximising profits, then the capital labour ratio will be a function of relative 
factor prices,
i.e. Ar,/(A,Z.,) = (( l-P )/p )0 [ - !^ ! - ] a (6)
C,
i.e. Yt =[p(A,Af,)"P + ( l - p ) ^ - p ]<_1/p)
where c, is the cost of capital. So by substituting (6) into (lb) the endogenous 
component of the price mark-up can be re-written as a function of relative factor 
prices in the non-Cobb-Douglas CES case.
(see Rowthom, 1996 for a related discussion of the importance of assuming the 
more general CES from rather than Cobb-Douglas).
Now consider the wage equation. As Bean (1994) notes, all theories of wage 
determination assume that the key variable is the ratio of wages to the reservation 
wage, usually defined as some function of unemployment benefits. This role for 
the ratio of inside wages relative to the outside option holds true whether we are 
considering models based on bargaining theories, or on a more general class of 
non-Walrasian model of the labour market which includes matching models and 
efficiency wage explanations. Perhaps surprisingly then, many empirical wage 




























































































the replacement ratio. Below, I will discuss why this may be entirely justifiable, 
but in the context of the theoretical models of wage determination it is not.5
It is useful to consider the derivation of a wage equation with rigorous theoretical 
underpinnings. The derivation to be followed here is fairly conventional, 
following closely that of Manning (1993).
It is assumed that the right to manage assumption holds, that is firms unilaterally 
choose employment, but bargain with employees over the appropriate level of 
wages. The union is assumed to maximise a utility function of the form
Ui, = Nft (yi t- v ta) (7)
where Vit is the value of employment in the firm and Va, is some measure of the 
alternatives available elsewhere in the economy. \\i represents the union’s 
preferences for employment relative to wages. The value functions are defined as
follows;
V,; =(»v„//>,)+a£,t<?,+1Vfu+1 + (l-9 ,+1)Vr+I] (8)
where 5 is the discount factor and q,+l is the probability of a worker employed 
this period being unemployed next. V, represents the value of being employed in 
another firm at time t, where a wage w, is earned. V“t is the value of being 
unemployed at time t, which is given by
V,“ =(B ,/P,) + a£([r,+1V“+14-(l-r,+1)Vf+1] (9)
where B, is the level of nominal unemployment benefits and s,+] is the probability 
of a worker who is unemployed this period remaining unemployed next. Workers 
made redundant are assumed to have some possibility of gaining employment 
elsewhere so the value of the alternative to working in the original firm is given
by
V',°=t1V/ + (1 - ti)V,“ (10)
Wages are set so as to maximise the Nash bargain where the fall back positions 
of both firms and unions are assumed to be zero, i.e.
w,, = a rg m ax (t/,?n ',l“x ) ) (11)





























































































where x  represents the bargaining power of the trade unions. It can be shown that 
the first order condition for maximising the Nash maximand with respect to w„ is 
given by
(w „/P ,)  = p ,(V „ -V ,a ) (12)
where g, =(peN +((l-xV x)£n
and where en and En are the elasticity of employment and profits with respect to 
the wage.
It can be shown that in the CES case, 
l
t N  = p
(1 - p )
and e n = 5 / (1 -  5) (where S is the labour share ).
Since the labour share will be a constant in the Cobb-Douglas case, g will 
therefore be a constant in the Cobb-Douglas case but will be an endogenous 
function of relative factor prices in the more general CES case. This distinction is 
crucial in what follows, in particular for the identification problem.
Once the symmetry condition is imposed by assuming that w„=w, _ we can rewrite 
(12) as
(* , / /> , ) = g r ( l - r | ) ( V , - V “ ) (13)
Then to derive an expression for wages in terms of observable variables, (V,-Vu,) 
can be derived as
V ,-V ,u = ( w / /3) , - (S /P ) ,+ 5 £ , ty ,+l9,+1)(V,+| - V ru+1) (14)
In order to derive an expression for the long run, it is now necessary to assume 
that the value functions converge to a dynamic steady state, i.e. (V,+|-Vu,+i)= 
(l+g)(Vt-Vu,) where g is the rate of growth of wages, leading to a relationship of 
the form
(W/P), _______ g(l-n )_______





























































































One point to note is that Manning (1993) derives a static rather than a dynamic 
steady state so his empirical specification ends up with a term in the real interest 
rate rather than the growth adjusted real interest rate as is derived here. This has 
important implications for his empirical results which depend heavily on the real 
interest rate effect.
Finally, by making plausible assumptions about the relationship between 
unemployment and the transition probabilities q and s, in particular that job 
quitters have a probability of staying unemployed of ys (where y<l), we can re­
write (15) as
(WIP) .=------------------------ — ------------------------ (B/P),  (16)
" [py+8(l + s )] l/- ( l+ 8 (l + s)9)[9Y+(l-<7y)t/]
This gives as an equation for the mark-up of real wages over the reservation 
wage, here simply benefits, which depends negatively on the unemployment rate 
and positively on the wage mark-up p.
Writing the replacement ratio, W/B as R, we can now write down a structural 
relationship for equilibrium unemployment,
PY(l-/t) + 5(l + g)-(H-<?8(l + g) X l -? r )  (17)
' (1 +q&(\+g))qy
This relationship illustrates clearly why, in this framework, the NRU will depend 
only on structural factors such as the replacement ratio and on the wage mark-up 
p which as shown above will itself depend on union power and constant 
parameters as well as on an endogenous effect if the technology is non-Cobb 
Douglas CES. This expression effectively gives us the vertical quasi-labour 
supply curve in the bargaining framework. In terms of the earlier diagram 
showing the wage and price setting curves, this defines the locus of equilibrium 
points which is traced out as labour demand is shocked (and hence as both the 
wage and price setting schedules are moved)
So what are the implications of this theoretical derivation for empirical 
researchers, many of whom have claimed to be basing their empirical approach 
on the bargaining framework? Equation (16) appears to give a clear 
recommendation. If the bargaining framework is valid, then real benefits should 
appear in a wage equation with a unit coefficient. But this would appear to 
contrast starkly with modelling practice. Often, equation (16) is log linearised, 
extra demand side variables such as productivity are added and the replacement 




























































































from the replacement ratio is dropped altogether, but this can not be valid under 
the maintained theoretical model since the replacement ratio is the theoretical 
linchpin of the bargaining approach.
Manning (1993) shows how this apparent contradiction can be resolved. 
Returning to equation (17), we have already shown how the wage mark-up p can 
be written as p=p(S,x) where S is the labour share and x is a proxy variable for 
bargaining power. Log linearising (17) and rearranging so that the labour share is 
on the left hand side, we have an expression
j = e o - e I£/,+e2R,+e3x 08)
and substituting in for the determinants of the labour share, 
i.e. s = w+n - p - y ,
we can write an expression for wages as
*7 -P t  =yi ~ nt +eo -01^( +e2̂ / +e3X (19)
This now looks much more familiar. Note that the replacement ratio still appears 
but no longer with a unit coefficient. (19) is the equation which Manning notes is 
unidentified because all of the variables from the labour demand curve (or from 
the price setting equation) are included in it. If Cobb-Douglas technology is 
assumed, this is clearly correct. If the Cobb-Douglas price setting equation 
implies a constant mark-up (say c0 in the log equation), then any attempt to 
estimate the structural equation (19) will in fact deliver
wi~ P t  =.v, - n ,  +Xca + (l-X .)(0o -0if/, + 0 2fl, + 6 3X) (20)
where A. is an arbitrary parameter (depending on the covariance properties of the 
two structural equations).
Importantly, however, this equation will be identified in the general CES non- 
Cobb-Douglas case since the labour share then also depends on relative factor 
prices. If such a term were to be included as suggested by Manning in order to 
capture the CES case (p. 107, Manning, 1993), then identification would fail, but 
there is no reason to include such a term since it is the labour share itself which 





























































































I now illustrate how such a wage equation can be estimated by includinb 
the labour share in a cointegrating relationship based on the struv 
unemployment relationship as derived in equation (17). Details of th.. 
econometric specification are as follows;
• The UK unemployment measure used here is the proportion not working of the 
total population of working age. This measure is preferred to the official claimant 
count which does not give as accurate a picture of true excess labour supply due 
to periodic shifts in the number of people moving off unemployment register to 
claim sickness and disability benefit. Ideally, a search-based ILO measure of 
unemployment would be used but this is not constructed on a consistent back to 
the 1960s as we require. Chart 3 illustrates.
• The data for the replacement ratio used in this paper is based on data provided 
by the Department of Social Security and analysed further by HM Treasury. In 
the context of this paper, it is important to emphasise one main point which 
stands out from the most cursory analysis; most measures of the replacement 
ratio, whether based on a naive expenditure basis (i.e. based on aggregate 
unemployment benefits paid out) or on a more sophisticated analysis based on the 
circumstances of different family types, all tend to trend downwards while any 
explanation of increased unemployment since the 1960s requires it to trend 
upwards. One possible explanation for the failure of the falling replacement ratio 
to track unemployment rates is that the denominator overstates the relevant 
earnings measure for an unemployed person. This will be a serious problem at a 
time when the earnings dispersion is widening. This measure of the replacement 
ratio has been modified by using the average earnings of manual workers in the 
denominator but this may still underestimate the true replacement ratio, especially 
if the “entry wages” for those trying to re-enter the labour market are particularly 
low. For the numerator, the weighted benefit payment paid to different categories 
of the unemployed has been used. Chart 4 illustrates. Clearly, the trend is still 
downwards.
• Chart 5 illustrates the labour share taking into account the effect of employers 
taxes. This shows a clear downward trend over the estimation period. Given the 
theoretical arguments advanced in the last section, this should cause 
unemployment to rise.
• In order to pick up unemployment persistence effects arising from hysteresis, a 
term in the proportion of long term (more than 12 months) unemployed is 
included. Chart 6 illustrates.
• A term in the growth adjusted (backward-looking) real interest rate is 




























































































_ oiiows the results from the Johansen estimation procedure. Cointegration 
is seen to fail when the labour share is excluded but one vector is present at the 
95% confidence limit when it is included. Normalising on unemployment, all 
variables take their expected sign , with positive and significant effects from the 
replacement ratio, long mn unemployment, with a negative effect from the labour 




























































































Chart 3: Percentage of the population 
not working Pe[cen,






Chart 5: Labour share percent 07oo Chart 6: Long term unemployment rate




























































































Table 1: Lone run estimation results
(I) Labour share not included: Cointegration rejected
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: PNWR, REPR, LMTUR
Johansen Maximum likelihood procedure (Trended case, with trend in DGP) 
Cointegration LR based on trace of the stochastic matrix. 
******************************************************************
106 observations from 1968Q1 to 1994Q2. Maximum lag in VAR=8.
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.12077 .091991 .012483
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value
r=0 r>=l 25.2037 29.6800 26.7850
r<=l r>=2 11.5607 15.4100 13.3250
r<=2 r>=3 1.3316 3.7620 2.6870
(II) Labour share included: Single cointegrating vector significant:
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: PNWR, REPR, LMTUR, LABSH
Johansen Maximum likelihood procedure (Trended case, with trend in DGP) 
Cointegration LR based on trace of the stochastic matrix. 
******************************************************************
106 observations from 1968Q1 to 1994Q2. Maximum lag in VAR=8. 
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.21121 .12006 .072402 .018156
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value
r=0 r>=l 48.6153 47.2100 43.949
r<=l r>=2 23.4663 29.6800 26.785
r<=2 r>=3 9.9089 15.4100 13.3250
r<=3 r>=4 1.9422 3.7620 2.6870
Estimated normalised cointegraing vector:
PNWR=0.600 REPR + 0.181 LMTUR-0.692 LABSH 
Data definitions:
PNWR: Percentage of working population not working 
REPR: Replacement ratio defined using earnings of manual workers 
LMTUR: Share of long term (>26 weeks) unemployed in total unemployment. 




























































































4. But what if the bargaining model is not valid?
The last section has showed that the practical problems in deriving structural 
estimates from the NAIRU caused by the identification problem may not be as 
severe as has been suggested. But arguably, there is one much more severe 
problem with the bargaining framework. This relates to the sector who are not 
covered by bargaining arrangements. Typically, this is dismissed as a minor 
irritation, despite the fact that trade union coverage has fallen substantially in the 
UK in recent years. It is often argued for example that other non-Walrasian 
theories of wage determination may still apply. Two main classes of models are 
usually suggested;
Search theories;
The simplest search-theoretic models explain ‘frictional’ unemployment as the 
inevitable consequence of a dynamic labour market where jobs are being created 
and destroyed and workers take time to find new employment. More 
sophisticated versions of this theory focus explicitly on heterogeneities and 
mismatches which make it costly for a worker and a firm to match their 
requirements, for example because of search costs for employees or hiring and 
training costs for employers (see Pissarides, 1990, for example). This transaction 
cost introduces local monopoly “rents” so that apart from compensating workers 
for the value of their marginal product as in the perfectly competitive case, firms 
and workers generate an additional surplus to be shared that is not driven to zero 
by competitive forces. This pushes unemployment above the market clearing 
NRU. Of course, the heterogeneity arises in the search model because insiders 
and outsiders differ (once hired, an employee is cheaper than an outsider). This 
distinction is clearly very closely related to the insider-outsider issue in 
bargaining models.
Efficiency wage models;
In these models, firms do not allow wages to fall to competitive levels since a 
higher wage is assumed to extract more input from the labour force, for example 
because higher wages attract higher quality workers or because they discourage 
shirking (for this reason, these are also referred to as “incentive wages”). 
Whereas unemployment served to discipline wage demands in the bargaining 
models, unemployment now acts as an incentive to spur higher productivity. As 
with the other models, a premium is earned, this time related to the difficulties in 
measuring individual workers’ characteristics, which pushes wages above 




























































































Given these theories, very similar structural variables are cited to explain changes 
in the steady state level of unemployment, in particular; the replacement ratio, 
since this represents the outside option to employees in all the theoretical
models).6
But it is also important to acknowledge, as is done explicitly in the dual labour 
market models proposed by Minford, (1983) for example, that the labour market 
may be much closer to the perfectly competitive paradigm for some sections of 
the labour market. This is very important since it will be in this “residual” labour 
market where aggregate unemployment will ultimately be determined. 
Consequently, it is useful to consider slightly more carefully what the implications 
of the market-clearing model is for the NRU paradigm.
The market-clearing model of the labour market
For simplicity, let us assume that labour participation is an all or nothing decision 
(arguably this is the relevant issue for the unemployed, not variation in hours), 
individual labour supply curves will be L-shaped. Individuals will accept any job 
above a wage-floor or reservation wage. This will be determined by the benefits 
received while unemployed (but not received while working). The critical 
reservation wage may be higher or lower than benefit levels depending on 
whether or not work incurs negative or positive utility. An aggregate labour 
supply schedule can be traced out by aggregating across individuals. The 
resulting curve illustrated in chart 8 will be convex to the origin due to 
heterogeneity in preferences (the more alike are individuals, the more L-shaped it 
becomes).
Chart 8: Aggregate labour demand and supply under perfect competition





























































































The key feature of this model is that all unemployment is “voluntary”. If it were 
otherwise, unemployed workers could offer themselves at lower wages, driving 
pay down to the reservation wage. Thus, unemployment is entirely explained by 
the marginal replacement ratio; equilibrium employment is determined by the 
point where the marginal revenue product of workers equals the reservation 
wage.
From the perspective of the NRU, it is also worth noting, although it is seldom 
emphasised, that there is no necessary reason why the equilibrium should be on 
the vertical portion of the aggregate labour supply curve. In such circumstances, 
shocks to labour demand will have permanent effects on unemployment and the 
concept of the NRU will not be very helpful for policy purposes.7 From the 
perspective of conventional NRU analysis this may seem heretical but there is 
increasing evidence that labour supply elasticities with respect to wages relative 
to outside options are very high amongst unemployed unskilled workers. 
Evidence to suggest that employment in these types of labour market in the US 
are driven by demand shocks is presented by Juhn et al., (1991).
It is useful to illustrate this point, albeit in a stylised way, by modifying the labour 
market equations of a conventional macroeconomic model. Let us suppose that 
the labour market consists of two types of labour, skilled and unskilled. The 
former are assumed to set wages in a bargaining framework while the latter 
participate in perfectly competitive markets. The number of potential workers in 
each category of labour is fixed, for simplicity at half the total working 
population. Demand for the different types of labour is conditioned on total 
labour demand which is based on conventional labour demand curves consistent 
with CES production technology (see NIESR, 1995). Relative demand for 
different types of labour is affected by relative wages with an elasticity of 0.2. 
This estimate is based on a crude calibration exercise. Wages in the market for 
skilled labour are set such that, in the long run (1-a) per cent of the skilled 
workforce find jobs, a  is set at 2 per cent to represent the effects of insider- 
outsider forces or efficiency wages. The dynamics for this skilled wages equation 
are identical to the aggregate equation estimated before. All unemployed skilled 
workers overflow into the market for unskilled workers where they are treated as 
if they were unskilled. Wages in the unskilled sector are determined by the 
interaction of the labour demand schedule with an upward sloping labour supply 
schedule of the “textbook” form shown in chart 8. Importantly, this has a 
horizontal portion and a vertical portion. It is clearly an empirical question as to 
which is the most appropriate functional form; this issue is not addressed here.




























































































Now consider a permanent increase in government spending. Charts 9(a)-(d) 
compare the effects of assuming that unskilled workers are operating on the 
vertical portion of their labour supply curve compared with the effects of the 
same shock when the horizontal part of the unskilled labour supply function is 
assumed to be operational. In the former case, the vertical labour supply curve 
ensures that unemployment and GDP returns to base in the long run. By contrast, 
in the latter case, if it is assumed that unemployment benefits are marked up in 
line with the earnings of unskilled workers, then because the increase in demand 
does not push up the wages of unskilled workers, unemployment falls (despite the 
fact that the replacement ratio is unchanged). The initial increase in the demand 
for workers in general is translated into a long run increase in the demand for 
unskilled workers only as the wages of skilled workers rise, both in absolute 
terms, and also relative to unskilled workers, who therefore become relatively 
more attractive to employ.
This example of the horizontal labour supply curve has deliberately been chosen 
to emphasise the effect of differences in labour supply behaviour between skill 
groups. In general, the size of the increase in demand for unskilled workers will 
depend on the shape of the labour supply curve and the position of the unskilled 
workforce on it.
Charts 10(a)-(b) show the effects of the same shock, now operating on the sloped 
portion of the labour supply curve. For simplicity', the elasticity of labour supply 
with respect to the replacement ratio is assumed to be 0.5. Two different sets of 
assumptions are examined, first that nominal benefits are fixed in nominal terms, 
then that benefits grow in line with average earnings. In the former case, because 
the shock raises nominal wages, the replacement ratio falls and unemployment 
falls in the long run accordingly (this may be thought of as cutting the benefit rate 
by stealth!). In the latter case, the movement in unskilled earnings is broadly 
similar to that of total earnings since the uprating of unemployment benefits in 
line with earnings has the effect of raising the labour supply curve by just enough 
to leave the ex post replacement ratio and hence unemployment virtually 
unchanged in the long ran.®
The purpose of these simulation results has been to illustrate how changing the 
basic assumptions about how the labour market works, actually in a rather 
plausible way, can have fundamental implications for the model properties and 
for the concept of the NRU in particular.
8 A similar exercise on a calibrated model is carried out in Pissarides (1996) who shows how 
the effect of a change in employers' payroll taxes is crucially influenced by the assumption that 

























































































































Chart 9(a>: Government spending shock
Unemployment rate (% of economically active)
--------Vertical Lab. Supp.
Horiz. Lab. Supp.
Chart 9(b): Government spending shock 
Real GDP
Chart 9(c): Government spending shock 
Number of unskilled workers in employment
--------Vertical Lab. Supp.

























































































































Chart 9(d): Government spending shock
Number of skilled workers in employment
Chart 10fal: Government spending shock; 
Unemployment rate (% of economically active)
--------Nominal benefits fixed
--------Real benefits fixed
Chart 10(b): Government spending shock; 








-  Nominal benefits fixed





























































































The NRU has assumed an important role in macroeconomic policy thinking 
because it places a limit on what macroeconomic policy should ultimately be 
expected to achieve in bringing down unemployment. If the steady state rate of 
unemployment actually can be affected by demand-side variables, then the 
conventional wisdom which focuses completely on structural supply-side reforms 
of the labour market to cut unemployment may be misplaced.
Surprisingly many empirically estimated NRUs do include demand side variables 
of one sort or another; the real exchange rate, world trade, the oil price, tax 
wedges. Indeed some of these demand side effects would seem to be implausible, 
sometimes implying a NRU that trends into the indefinite future. Taking the 
conventional framework of the imperfectly competitive bargaining model, this 
paper has argued, following Manning (1993) in particular, that many of these 
effects emerge because of insufficiently rigorous theoretical underpinnings to the 
wage determination process. The extent to which the NRU can nevertheless be 
affected by the demand side through relative factor prices is explained and it is 
shown how this feature can be exploited to resolve the well known identification 
problem afflicting structural wage equations. An empirical estimate of the UK 
NRU has been derived using this approach.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the distinction between absent demand 
effects on the NRU and highly persistent effects due to hysteresis mechanisms 
only resolves itself in the very long run. Various different sources of hysteresis 
have been discussed in the literature. Here, an alternative explanation is offered 
as to why the NRU tends to move around so much, especially in the face of 
demand shocks. This is because significant parts of the labour market may be 
competitive, in particular for those workers most prone to becoming unemployed, 
and workers may not be operating on the vertical portion of the labour supply 
curve. Indeed, if they were, the effect of cutting benefits would have little effect 
on unemployment (see chart 8 again). This paper has produced no empirical 
evidence to support this argument. But if it is true, it is all the more important that 
a structural rather than a purely statistical approach to analysing the labour 
market is taken which recognises the important heterogeneities in the labour 
market. The challenge for empirical modellers of labour market behaviour is to 
determine the extent to which the inevitably inadequate information about the 
demand and supply for different types of labour can be used to uncover the 
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